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Days before his death, southern Arizona rancher Robert Krentz
found large quantities of illegal drugs on his 35,000-acre farm and
reported it to the police.1 On March 27, 2010, Krentz was shot and
killed by an unknown assailant while he worked on an isolated
corner of the ranch.2 Many speculated that the assailant who killed
Krentz was in the country illegally and,3 for many, Krentz’s death
justified associating the immigration issue with danger.4
Three weeks later, the Governor of Arizona had the “Support Our
Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” (hereinafter “the

*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of LawFayetteville.
**
Assistant Professor of Law & Immigration Law Clinic Director,
University of Arkansas School of Law-Fayetteville.
1

Philip S. Moore, Border Fight: Murdered Rancher Who Helped
Immigrants Spurred on Arizona Law, NAT’L CATHOLIC REGISTER, May 9, 2010,
http://www.ncregister.com/register_exclusives/border_fight/ (reporting the size
of his ranch); Linda Chavez, Arizona Mythbusting, PARAGOULD DAILY PRESS,
May
4,
2010,
http://www.paragoulddailypress.com/articles/2010/05/04/opinion/doc4be06f86c
4068436941752.txt (reporting that Krentz contacted the authorities).
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Moore, supra note 1.
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Specifically, law enforcement believes that an illegal immigrant who
was headed to Mexico and worked as a scout for drug smugglers may have
killed Krentz. Jacques Billeaud, Official: Suspect in AZ Ranch Death Recently
in
US,
LAKE
WYLIE
PILOT,
May
3,
2010,
http://www.lakewyliepilot.com/2010/05/03/714474/official-suspect-in-az-ranchdeath.html.
4

See Michael J. O’Neal, The Arizona Immigration Law: Some Things
You Probably Didn’t Know About Arizona Politics, HUFFINGTON POST, May 3,
2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-j-o/the-arizona-immigrationl_b_561924.html (“While it is likely that the perpetrator was involved in drugs
or smuggling (groups who are known to carry weapons) rather than manual
workers who comprise the vast majority of illegal immigration (and who are not
known to carry weapons), this distinction could easily be lost in the wave of
public sympathy and outrage at a senseless murder.”); see also Dennis Wagner,
Arizona Rancher’s Slaying Sparks Debate Over Illegal Immigration, AZ
CENTRAL.COM,
March
29,
2010,
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/03/29/20100329rancher-killed-atarizona-ranch.html (“The unsolved murder Saturday of a soft-spoken rancher in
southern Arizona has become a new flashpoint in the debate over illegal
immigration . . . .”).
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Act” or “the Arizona Act”) on her desk.5 Otherwise known as SB
1070, the patchwork set of laws makes it a misdemeanor to lack
proper immigration paperwork in Arizona.6 More controversially,
the Act also enables officers who develop a “reasonable suspicion”
to believe that someone is undocumented to stop that individual
and determine the person’s immigration status.7 An individual’s
inability to provide government-issued identification proving legal
residency, such as a driver’s license, subjects that individual to
twenty days in jail for the first violation (thirty for subsequent
violations), and a fine up to $100 plus jail costs.8 In an effort to
soften the Act’s obvious ethnic and racial implications, it expressly
states that “[a] law enforcement official or agency of this state or a
county, city, town or other political subdivision of this state may
not solely consider race, color or national origin in implementing
the requirements of this subsection except to the extent permitted
by the United States or Arizona Constitution.”9
Public response to the Act has been extreme and appeared from
unlikely sources. Arizona’s professional basketball team, the
Phoenix Suns, wore their orange “Los Suns” jerseys on May 5 in
Game 2 of their playoff series against the San Antonio Spurs in
part to express opposition to the new Arizona immigration law.10
In a press release issued before the game, the Suns’ owner, Robert
Sarver, suggested that “frustration with the federal government's
failure to deal with the issue of illegal immigration resulted in
passage of a flawed state law.”11
Major League Baseball has also protested the law. Approximately
twenty-seven percent of Major League Baseball players are Latino
5

Michael J. O’Neal, The Arizona Immigration Law: Some Things You
Probably Didn’t Know About Arizona Politics, HUFFINGTON POST, May 3, 2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-j-o/the-arizona-immigrationl_b_561924.html.
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ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509(H) (2010).
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ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2010).
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ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509(H) (2010).
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ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2010).
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Dan Bickley, Phoenix Suns Owner’s Bold Statement on Immigration
Changes Focus of Game 2, AZ CENTRAL.COM, May 4, 2010,
http://www.azcentral.com/sports/suns/articles/2010/05/04/20100504phoenixsuns-immigration-law-bickley.html#ixzz0n4FIxxXD.
11

J.A. Adande, Suns Using Jerseys to Send Message, ESPN.COM, May
7,
2010,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/playoffs/2010/columns/story?columnist=adande_j
a&page=Sarver-100504.
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and nearly half of the teams hold their spring training camps in
Arizona.12 Protestors recently turned out to Wrigley Field in
Chicago to rally against the Act just before the Chicago Cubs were
set to take on the Arizona Diamondbacks.13 Given the Major
League Baseball Players Association’s opposition to the Act, there
is growing speculation that fans will boycott the MLB’s 2011 AllStar game – currently scheduled in Phoenix.14
Of course, the athletic community is hardly alone in voicing
displeasure with the Act. Rallies nationwide – including in New
York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, and Denver – have unified
thousands in favor of federal immigration reform and to protest the
passage of the Arizona Act.15 University of Arizona students have
pressed the University’s president, Robert N. Shelton, to publicly
denounce the Act and, in doing so, have noted that “[t]he families
of a number of out-of-state students (to date all of them honors
students) have told us that they are changing their plans and will be
sending their children to universities in other states.”16 Moreover,
city councils in Oakland and San Francisco have voted to
economically boycott Arizona.17
Other cities are actively
contemplating doing the same.18
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Akito Yoshikane, Baseball Union and Players Speak Out Against
SB1070,
IN
THESE
TIMES,
May
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2010,
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/5943/baseball_union_and_players_speak
_out_against_sb1070/.
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Kevin Baxter, Consequences Could Follow Illegal Immigration Law:
New York Congressman Calls For Major League Baseball to Put 2011 All-Star
Game
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Arizona,
CHICAGO
TRIBUNE,
Apr.
29,
2010,
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Id.
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Kara Spak, Thousands Protest Arizona Law, Demand Immigration
Reform,
CHICAGO
SUN
TIMES,
May
2,
2010
http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/2223858,mayday-immigration-rally050110.article.
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May
12,
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Stephanie Condon, More City Councils Move Toward Arizona
Boycotts Over Immigration Law, CBS NEWS, Apr, 29, 2010,
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20003803-503544.html.
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Id.
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Perhaps most importantly, however, the federal judiciary recently
weighed in by enjoining enforcement of most of the Act.19 United
States District Court Judge Susan R. Bolton found that “preserving
the status quo through a preliminary injunction is less harmful than
allowing state laws that are likely preempted by federal law to be
enforced.”20 By enjoining enforcement of the Act on preemption
grounds, the accompanying Fourth Amendment issue remains
unresolved.
The preemption aside, the Act seems to suggest that “driving while
black”21 is out with the 2000s and in Arizona “driving (or
breathing?) while brown” is now “in.”22 Are citizens therefore no
longer concerned with law enforcement profiling AfricanAmericans? Of course not.23 The Arizona Act merely serves to
19

United States v. Arizona, No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB, (D. Ariz. July
28,
2010),
available
at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20100729_ARIZONA_DO
C.pdf.
20

Id., slip. op. at 35. The court enjoined the following sections: (1)
requiring officers to make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration
status of a detained person if there is a reasonable suspicion that the person
unlawfully present in the U.S., id. slip, op. at 4, 36 (enjoining Section 2(B),
creating A.R.S. § 11-1051 (B)); (2) creating a crime for the failure to apply for
or carry registration papers, id. (enjoining Section 3 creating A.R.S. § 13-1509);
(3) creating a crime for unauthorized aliens to solicit, apply for, or perform
work, id. (enjoining the portion of Section 5 creating A.R.S. § 13-2928 (C)); and
(4) authorizing the warrantless arrest of a person when there is probable cause to
believe that person has committed a public offense that makes the person
removable from the United States, id. (enjoining Section 6 creating A.R.S. § 133883 (A)(5)).
21
See generally David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other
Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997).
22

Conservative lawmakers in Oklahoma say they will introduce a bill
similar to the Arizona Act in their state. One Republican state representative
even told The Associated Press that Oklahoma may take Arizona’s example
further by including asset seizure provisions and harsher penalties. Ethan Sacks,
Battle Over Arizona’s SB 1070: Oklahoma Eyes Similar Immigration Law; City
Councils Eye Boycotts, NY DAILY NEWS, Apr. 30, 2010,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2010/04/30/2010-0430_battle_over_arizonas_sb_1070_oklahoma_eyes_similar_immigration_law_ci
ty_councils.html. Oklahoma is not alone in possibly following Arizona. See
Ryan Takeo, Mich Fruit Pickers Oppose AZ-style law: ‘Take Our Jobs’
Challenge Set for July 24, WOOD TV8, July 12, 2010,
http://www.woodtv.com/dpp/news/local/grand_rapids/Mich-fruit-pickersoppose-AZ-style-law (“[Michigan] House Bill 6526 allows police officers to
arrest and detain people with sufficient reasonable suspicion they are in the
country illegally.”).
23
Kevin R. Johnson, The Legacy of Jim Crow: The Enduring Taboo of
Black-White Romance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 739, 761 (2006) (book review)
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continue an effort—this time at the legislative level—to broaden
the discretionary power of law enforcement. Yet, a fascinating
question lies at the base of the public’s pervasive criticism of the
Act: where have all of you people been? Numerous Supreme
Court cases already allow for law enforcement to engage in the
very practice—racial and ethnic profiling premised on “reasonable
suspicion”24—that has incited the emotions of so many citizens
(commenting that “racial profiling remains a problem in the United States
today”); see Al Baker, New York Minorities More Likely to Be Frisked, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A1 (reporting that an analysis of the 2009 raw data by
the Center for Constitutional Rights revealed that nearly 490,000 blacks and
Latinos were stopped by the police on the streets last year, compared with
53,000 whites).
24

Given the focus in this Article on reasonable suspicion, it does not
consider other powerful judicial doctrines that expand law enforcement
discretion; most notably, the Court’s “special needs” jurisprudence.” The
“special needs” rule allows for suspicionless searches when “‘special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and[/or]
probable-cause requirement[s] impracticable.’” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)). To determine the validity of policy or law allowing
for a suspicionless search, the Supreme Court applies a “general Fourth
Amendment approach” to determine reasonableness “by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which [a search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and,
on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.” Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006).
Relying on this analysis, the Court has upheld, inter alia, the following
suspicionless Fourth Amendment intrusions as constitutional: (1) highway
checkpoint stops during which officers ask citizens about a recent crime, Illinois
v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2004); (2) sobriety checkpoints, Mich. Dep’t of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); (3) brief seizures of motorists at
border patrol checkpoints, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562
(1976); (4) certain work-related searches by government employers of
employees’ desks and offices, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987);
(5) school officials searching some student property, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 340 (1985); and (6) some governmental searches conducted pursuant
to a regulatory scheme, see, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03
(1987) (upholding a New York law requiring junkyard owners to maintain
records for routine spontaneous inspections by police officers and state agents);
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981) (upholding a statute that enabled
federal mine inspectors to inspect mining company’s quarries without a search
warrant); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1972) (upholding guncontrol law allowing for warrantless “compliance checks” of individuals who
were federally licensed to deal in sporting weapons); Camara v. Mun. Court,
387 U.S. 523, 539-40 (1967) (finding unconstitutional a city ordinance that gave
city building inspectors the right to enter any building at reasonable times in
furtherance of their code-enforcement duties). Given that government’s
“general interest in crime control” will not justify a suspicionless search, City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000), the Supreme Court upholds
certain laws pursuant to the special-needs doctrine when there exists “no law
enforcement purpose behind the searches” and “there [is] little, if any,
entanglement with law enforcement[,]” Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S.
67, 79 n.15 (2001).
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nationwide. So, regardless of whether the Act is preempted, the
very conduct codified by the Act and objectionable to so many is
already condoned by a series of Supreme Court cases.
This Article therefore argues that the Arizona Act, while notable
for the public response to it, is merely emblematic of a much larger
and systemic problem that exists because of the collective core
holdings from several Supreme Court Fourth Amendment cases.
Indeed, law enforcement stops of persons lawfully present in the
United States using an “illegal immigrant” profile existed before
the Act and will remain permissible regardless of the Act’s
ultimate fate. Part I compiles and synthesizes varied Supreme
Court cases that bestow upon local law enforcement an inordinate
amount of discretionary power both on the street and in an
automobile. Part II offers a primer on immigration law in order to
thereafter explain what exactly is illegal about being an “illegal
immigrant.” That same part also considers the available law
enforcement agencies—both federal and state—charged with
enforcing immigration law. Part III contends that the combination
of law enforcement tools and immigration consequences provides
law enforcement with a level of power and discretion comparable
to that bestowed by the Arizona Act. That power, Part III asserts,
allows for the pervasive de facto or express creation of an “illegal
immigrant” profile and a corresponding propensity by law
enforcement to stop individuals or cars using that profile.
I.
This Part seeks to non-exhaustively synthesize several Supreme
Court cases that, when applied at the border, equal or exceed the
level of discretion bestowed upon officers by the Arizona Act. In
doing so, Section A first considers notable Supreme Court cases
that apply nationwide—without regard to a suspect’s relationship
to the border. Then, Section B briefly reviews a handful of borderspecific Supreme Court cases.
A.

Cases of Nationwide Applicability.

To be clear at the outset, the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution serves as the limitation on the government’s
ability to impede or otherwise limit citizens’ freedom of
Perhaps most importantly for purposes of this footnote, the Court has
also upheld routine investigatory searches of cars and personal effects of
arrestees, Colordo v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1987), and routine
suspicionless searches at the border of persons and their effects, United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).

6

movement.25 And, within the context of stopping a vehicle or
detaining a citizen on the street, the first question is whether,
during that stop or detention, officers have “seized” the individual
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The importance of
that question cannot be overstated; indeed, if the police activity is
not a “seizure”, then the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply
to the governmental conduct.26
Unlike the word “search,” which has only one constitutional
definition,27 the word “seizure” has two: one that relates to
property and the other that relates to the seizure of persons.28 In
the case of persons, law enforcement must have adequate cause to
seize an individual and, in the specific case of an in-home arrest,
officers must ordinarily possess an arrest warrant.29 Regardless of
whether an arrest warrant is required, however, an arrest or its
functional equivalent must be supported by probable cause.30
The Court has, however, also held that circumstances short of an
arrest may constitute a less intrusive seizure, subject to a less
stringent level of Fourth Amendment review. In the context of
officer-citizen encounters, a person has been “seized” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the
circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave.31 Assuming a person has been seized within
the meaning of that definition, the question ordinarily shifts to

25

See generally Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).

26

E.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984).

27

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (defining a “search” as police conduct that invades a person’s
subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as “reasonable”).
28

Compare Karo, 468 U.S. at 712 (“A seizure of property occurs when
‘there is some meaningful interference with an individuals’ possessory interests
in that property.’” (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added)), with United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (“[A] person is ‘seized’ only
when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of
movement is restrained.” (emphasis added)).
29

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588-89 (1980).

30

See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979).

31

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991); Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
at 554. Although to some extent outside the scope of this paper, an uncomplied
with request to stop is not a seizure. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626
(1991). A suspect who continues to flee after an officer yells “stop” has
therefore not been “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. On the other
hand, a submission to that show of force is a seizure. Id.
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determining whether law enforcement had a sufficient
justification—i.e., probable cause—for detaining the citizen.
Yet, in 1968, the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio32
made constitutional certain limited intrusions on a person’s liberty
based on something less than probable cause.33 Specifically, so
says Terry, an officer may stop an individual based on “reasonable
suspicion” to believe that criminal activity is afoot.34 In defining
reasonable suspicion, the Court held the officer “need not be
absolutely certain the individual is armed; the issue is whether a
reasonable prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted
in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”35 If
nothing during that stop dispels the officer’s suspicion, then he
may likewise engage in a limited pat down of the suspect’s outer
clothing.36
Notably, Terry provided the impetus, as well as the framework, for
a stronger move by the Supreme Court away from the proposition
that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable,37 to the
32

392 U.S. 1 (1968).

33

Id. at 7.

34

Id. at 30.

35

Id. at 27.

36

Id. (noting that a frisk is permissible if there exists “the more
immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him”).
37
The Supreme Court’s early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
resoundingly suggested that searches conducted without a warrant were
presumptively “unreasonable.” See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486-87
(1964); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960); see also Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610, 614 (1961) (“[The Fourth Amendment’s]
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493, 498 (1958) (“The decisions of this Court have time and again underscored
the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment to shield the citizen from
unwarranted intrusions into his privacy.”). That position was forcefully
reaffirmed by the Court’s 1967 decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), wherein it observed that “searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment–subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.” Id. at 357. Although the Court in the following
two decades approved of more exceptions to the warrant “requirement,” see,
e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (allowing for warrantless
searches of an arrestee’s car post-arrest); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 242-43 (1973) (allowing for warrantless searches premised on an
individual’s consent); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969)

8

competing view that the Fourth Amendment requires evaluating
“the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”38 In other
words, warrantless police conduct became much easier to justify
after Terry. The bottom line is hopefully reasonably clear: the
Court no longer treats all searches and all seizures alike. And, as a
result of Terry, many police-citizen on-the-street encounters that
do not involve arrests or full-blown searches come within the
scope of the Fourth Amendment are lawful notwithstanding the
absence of a warrant or probable cause.
The question then becomes whether Terry’s reach extends to
scenarios other than citizen-police encounters on the street. In
1990, the Court made clear in Alabama v. White39 that the concept
of “reasonable suspicion” applies to car stops. In White, police
received an anonymous tip indicating that a woman would leave a
particular apartment building at a particular time and would drive
to a particular motel.40 After corroborating the place and time of
the woman’s departure, officers stopped her car as she drove in the
hotel’s direction.41 The Court held that the combination of the
anonymous tip and the police corroboration established sufficient
indicia of reliability to constitute a reasonable suspicion and thus
permit an investigative stop.42

(allowing for warrantless searches incident to arrest), it continued to periodically
highlight the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause as the predominant clause,
see, e.g., Belton, 453 U.S. at 457 (“It is a first principle of the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that the police may not conduct a search unless they
first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so.”);
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 (“It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable
cause is ‘per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions.’”) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357); Chimel, 395
U.S. at 762 (observing “the general requirement that a search warrant be
obtained is not lightly to be dispensed with”) (citation omitted).
38

Terry, 392 U.S. at 19. Perhaps the truest precursor to the Court’s
“reasonableness” jurisprudence came in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56 (1950), wherein it held that warrantless searches incident to arrest are
constitutional, id. at 65-66. In doing so, the Court noted that the appropriate test
of police conduct “is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant,
but whether the search was reasonable.” Id. at 66.
39

496 U.S. 325 (1990)

40

Id. at 327.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 332.
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Knowing now that reasonable suspicion reaches both street
encounters and car stops, the question turns to how officers can
generate “reasonable suspicion.” We know that a suspect’s
flight,43 a suspect’s avoidance of a checkpoint,44 a suspect’s
presence in a “high crime” neighborhood,45 or an informant’s tip,46
are all factors that could provide an officer with reasonable
suspicion to believe that criminal activity is afoot. But, asked
differently (and more dramatically), could racist officers initiate a
race-based stop predicated on probable cause – or reasonable
suspicion – to believe that the driver committed a non-criminal
traffic violation? Answer: sure. Whichever standard governs, be
it probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the Court has
specifically stated that the subjective intentions of the police
officer do not alter Fourth Amendment analysis.47
In United States v. Whren,48 plainclothes vice-squad officers were
patrolling a “high drug area” of Washington D.C. in an unmarked
car.49 They watched petitioners’ Pathfinder sit at an intersection
for what seemed to the officers to be an unusually long time.50
When officers turned their car around toward petitioners, the
Pathfinder suddenly turned right without signaling and sped off.51
Officers stopped the Pathfinder and seized two large bags of crack
cocaine.52
Petitioners subsequently challenged the legality of their car stop,
arguing that it was not justified by probable cause, or even
43

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000); Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968).
44

See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 271 (2002).

45

Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1972)).

46

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).

47

United States v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).

48

517 U.S. 806 (1996).

49

Id. at 808. Notably, a few years after Whren, a cover story in the
Washington City Paper detailed the many transgressions of Officer Soto – one
of the arresting officers in Whren – including excessive force, incredible
preliminary hearing testimony, falsified police reports, and witness coaching.
See generally Jason Cherkis, Rough Justice: How Four Vice Officers Served as
Judge and Jury on the Streets of MPD’s 6th District, WASH. CITY PAPER, Jan. 713,
2000,
available
at
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/18752/rough-justice.
50

Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.

51

Id.

52

Id. at 809.
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reasonable suspicion, to believe that petitioners were engaged in
illegal drug activity.53 Moreover, they contended, allowing
officers to rely on suspected traffic violations as a basis to stop a
motorist could create “the temptation to use traffic stops as a
means of investigating other law violations, as to which no
probable cause or even articulable suspicion exists,” and would
allow officers to base stops on impermissible factors, like race.54
Accordingly, they argued that in the context of traffic stops, the
Fourth Amendment test should be whether a police officer, acting
reasonably, would have made the stop for the specific reason
given, rather than simply whether probable cause existed
generally.55 The Court rejected petitioners’ argument and stated,
in part, the following:
We think [cases cited by the Court] foreclose any
argument that the constitutional reasonableness of
traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of
the individual officer involved. We of course agree
with the petitioners that the Constitution prohibits
selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race. But the constitutional
basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory
application of the law is the Equal Protection
Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis.[56]
How far does that language extend? Although the Court phrased
the last sentence narrowly in probable cause terms, the first
sentence demonstrates its true breadth: actual motivations of the
individual officer are not a factor in the reasonableness of all
traffic stops—regardless of whether those stops were based on
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.57
53

Id.

54

Id. at 810.

55

Id.

56

Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.

57

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001) (ignoring an
officer’s subjective motivations in the context of reasonable suspicion analysis);
see United States v. Callaraman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir. 2001) (“When
determining whether an officer possessed a reasonable articulable suspicion, the
subjective motivations of an arresting officer are irrelevant.” (citations
omitted)). The ability of law enforcement to make pretextual stops is
particularly powerful given their corresponding abilities to conduct a search
incident to arrest for minor traffic offenses (even where the state law does not
require an arrest for such an offense), Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265
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B.

A Few Border-Specific Cases.

With Terry, White, and Whren firmly in mind, let’s now direct our
attention more specifically to how those cases operate on the
border. To begin with, and let’s be crystal clear, the functional
equivalent of the Arizona Act has been around nationwide since
1975. In United States v. Brigoni-Ponce,58 the Court held that
officers on roving patrol may constitutionally stop a vehicle if they
have “reasonable suspicion” to believe “that the vehicles contain
aliens who may be illegally in the country.”59 Most importantly,
though, Brigoni-Ponce provided a list of possible factors that, if
present, would support a finding of reasonable suspicion (and look
an awful lot like an “illegal immigrant” profile). Those factors
include (1) the area of the stop and its relation to the border; (2)
aspects of the vehicle itself (like those with large compartments);
(3) whether the vehicle appears to be heavily loaded; and (4) “the
characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying
on such factors as the mode of dress and haircut.”60
With that digression complete, we return to post-Whren doctrine
and the Court’s 2002 decision in United States v. Arvizu.61 In
Arvizu, a border patrol agent stopped respondent as he drove on an
unpaved road in a desolate area of southeastern Arizona.62 A
subsequent search of his vehicle revealed more than 100 pounds of
marijuana.63 Several factors supported the border patrol agent’s
decision to stop the vehicle, including that: (1) it triggered a
sensor along a roadway often traveled by individuals seeking to
(1973), and arrest persons for misdemeanors punishable by only a fine, Atwater
v. City of Largo Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
58

422 U.S. 873 (1975).

59

Id. at 884. Prior to Brigoni-Ponce, the Court had held in AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, that roving patrols required a warrant or probable
cause to search vehicles at points removed from the border or its functional
equivalent. 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973). Brigoni-Ponce did not overrule
Almeida-Sanchez, instead electing to distinguish it on the basis that BrigoniPonce dealt only with the Border Patrol’s authority to question vehicle
occupants about their immigration status but not their authority to search
vehicles. 422 U.S. at 874.
60

Id. at 885-87 (noting “[t]he likelihood that any given person of
Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a
relevant factor”) (emphasis added).
61

534 U.S. 266 (2002).

62

Id. at 268.

63

Id. at 272.
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avoid checkpoints; (2) respondent was driving a minivan; (3) it
slowed dramatically when the agent neared; (4) it contained five
occupants; (5) the driver appeared stiff and did not look at the
agent; (6) the knees of the two children sitting in the very back seat
were unusually high; (7) the children in the vehicle simultaneously
waved at the agent; and (8) the vehicle was registered to an area
notorious for alien and narcotics smuggling.64
Following the district court’s denial of respondent’s motion to
suppress the marijuana, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed after concluding that several factors relied upon by the
agent to justify stopping respondent were impermissible.65 In
particular, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a majority of the factors
were not suggestive of criminal activity and therefore carried little
or no weight in the reasonable suspicion calculus.66 Although the
Supreme Court agreed that several factors were “susceptible to
innocent explanation,”67 it nevertheless reversed by deferring to
the agent’s observations, his registration check of respondent’s
vehicle, and his experience as a border patrol agent.68
Taken together, it seems fair to conclude that the Court in BrigoniPonce made constitutional an “illegal immigrant profile” and then
expressed a willingness to defer to a border patrol agent’s use of
that profile in Arvizu. That conclusion is surely bolstered by the
Court’s past willingness to condone profiling generally,69 and its
corresponding willingness to show deference to reasonable
suspicion decisions made by officers in the field.70

64

Id. at 269-72.

65

Id. at 272.

66

Id.

67

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277.

68

Id.

69

See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (“A court
sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent
to articulate the factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these factors
may be set forth in a ‘profile’ does not somehow detract from their evidentiary
significance as seen by a trained agent.”); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243
(1983) (stating that defendant’s flight into Palm Beach, overnight stay in a motel
and apparent immediate return to Chicago, with the family car awaiting him was
“as suggestive of a pre-arranged drug run, as it [was] of an ordinary vacation
trip”); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 548 n.1 (noting that the suspect’s behavior fit
“the so-called ‘drug-courier profile’—an informally compiled abstract of
characteristics though typical of persons carrying illicit drugs”).
70
E.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (“[T]he
evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library
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II.
This Part explores the possible immigration consequences of a
fruitful stop; i.e., a stop in which an officer discovers an
individual’s undocumented status. To do so, this Part offers, in
Section A, a brief primer on immigration law and thereafter, in
Section B, considers whether there is anything illegal—i.e.,
criminally punishable—about being a so-called illegal immigrant.
Section C concludes by explaining the relationship between federal
immigration agents and local law enforcement.
A.

Immigration Law: The Basics.

Immigration law is a complex and interwoven set of statutes found
in the Immigration and Nationality Act and Title 8 of the United
States Code.71 Speaking broadly, these statutes codify (1) the
means of obtaining immigration status in the United States, (2) the
reasons why an alien can either be ineligible for entry into the
United States—often termed “inadmissible”72—or deportable from
the United States,73 and (3) the process by which removal is
accomplished.74 Although the majority of the immigration code
describes civil proceedings and penalties, it also includes criminal
provisions for certain immigration violations.
The immigration code categorizes immigrants according to varied
“types of status,” and two main categories of aliens present in the
United States are most relevant to this Article: documented
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analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law
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Immigration laws are codified in Title 8 of the U.S.C. with parallel
citations in the Immigration and Nationality Act. This Article will cite to the
United States Code sections throughout.
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Aliens are inadmissible if they fit within the categories provided in 8
U.S.C. § 1182. Section 1182 contains ten main categories of inadmissibility,
including health-related grounds, criminal grounds, and immigration offense
related grounds. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
73

Deportability grounds appear in 8 U.S.C. § 1227. There are seven
main categories within this section, many similar to those listed in § 1182.
74

Prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, immigration laws referred to “deporting”
an alien. Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. The current version of the INA
calls aliens who are ineligible for admission “inadmissible.” It also terms those
who have been admitted but are no longer eligible to stay “deportable.” Finally,
any alien who is either inadmissible or deportable is, by consequence,
“removable.”
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immigrants and undocumented immigrants.75
Documented
immigrants are generally either temporary nonimmigrants present
for a specific purpose—e.g., an ambassador, student, or tourist76—
or lawful permanent residents (“LPRs”).77 LPRs are present in the
United States on a more permanent basis, and have the ability to
naturalize after a period of stay ranging between three to five
years.78 Both nonimmigrants and LPRs are inspected at the
border.79 During inspection, border agents must assess whether the
alien is inadmissible pursuant to certain categories of
inadmissibility.80 Importantly, there are also two types of
undocumented aliens: those who were initially inspected and
admitted but overstayed their legal stay,81 and those who were
never legally admitted.
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Other types of status exist. For example, the alien may possess
Temporary Protected Status, 8 U.S.C. § 1254, be eligible for relief pursuant to
section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act
(NACARA), Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2196-2200 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), obtain asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, or
acquire withholding of removal, id. § 1231(b)(3). A small group of individuals
might enter the United States without a visa pursuant to the Visa Waiver
Program, which enables individuals from countries with low immigration rates
and high temporary travel rates to visit the United States for fewer than ninety
days for tourism or business. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau
of Consular Affairs, Visa Waiver Program (VWP), TRAVEL.STATE.GOV.,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html (last visited Aug.
23, 2010).
76

The United States Code lists twenty-two temporary visas, alongside
so-called “derivatives” for the spouse and children of primary visa holders. 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15).
77

Lawful permanent residents are colloquially known as “green card”
holders, though the card they receive is no longer green and looks more like a
driver’s license. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Profiles on Legal Permanent
Residents,
DEP’T
OF
HOMELAND
SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/data/dslpr.shtm (last visited Aug. 08, 2010).
78
Naturalization requires a specific period of residence in the United
States, good moral character, comprehension of the English language, adherence
to the principles of the Constitution, and knowledge of American history. Id. §§
1423, 1427.
79

See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(7)(A), 1181(b) (discussing
documents for readmission of returning resident immigrants and
nonimmigrants).
80

8 U.S.C. § 1182.

81

For instance, students are usually admitted to the United States for
“duration of status,” meaning they are eligible to stay in the United States so
long as they maintain their status as a student. They must leave the United
States upon graduation. Individuals who overstay their student visa are
deportable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1).

15

Deleted: For instance, aside
from the three major categories
mentioned above, there are many
other ways aliens can be present in
the United States such as under …
(found in …)… (found in
... [2]
Formatted: Font: 10 pt,
Highlight
Deleted: )… (… contains the
basic asylum requirements), …
(found in…USC… …) to name a
few… It bears mentioning that there
is …a…that …come to…under
that have…come to…a stay of less
... [3]
Deleted: See …

... [4]

Deleted: USC…sets out a …of
22… with…,… the…
... [5]
Deleted: for a list of the types of
temporary visas

Deleted: See INA §§ 312-337
for requirements and prerequisites to
naturalization,
Deleted: Requirements for n
Deleted: including
Deleted: include…
requirements…ttachment…U.S.... [6]
Formatted: Font: 10 pt,
Italic
Deleted: 8 USC… –
... [7]
Deleted: which …s…that …as
Once they graduate from
school,…t…If they stay past this
time, they will become …under ... [8]

Regardless of their status, all aliens in the United States are subject
to inadmissibility and deportability standards at some point during
their time in the United States.82 The standards for inadmissibility
and deportability are generally similar and exclude individuals on
the basis of health-related, criminal, security, public charge, and
immigration violation grounds, though the statutes do treat the
relevance of prior criminal conduct differently.83 Taking each
concept in turn, the inadmissible alien is one who is not eligible to
enter the United States. Stated more specifically, any alien who
enters the United States through the inspection and admission
process is subject to inadmissibility standards; if the alien is
deemed inadmissible pursuant to those standards, she will not be
admitted into the country.84
Once an alien is admitted into the country, deportation standards
replace those governing admissibility. Regardless of whether the
alien is temporary or permanent, she must abide by those standards
during the totality of her stay in the United States.86 Thus, for
example, the alien who commits certain crimes while in the United
States immediately becomes deportable and subject to removal
from the country.87 Aliens who overstay their lawful period of
82

An Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent can issue a Notice
to Appear, thereby placing the alien in removal proceedings, if the agent
suspects that the alien is either inadmissible or deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
83

For instance, both § 1227(a)(2)(B), the deportability statutes, and §§
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 1182(a)(2)(C), the inadmissibility statute, address aliens
who were previously convicted for any offense related to a controlled substance.
The deportability statute, however, exempts simple possession of thirty or fewer
grams of marijuana, § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), and includes waivers not present in the
inadmissibility statute, e.g. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (possession of marijuana of thirty
or fewer grams); §1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (waiver for certain criminal offenses where
alien, subsequent to conviction, has been granted full and unconditional pardon
by the President or a governor). This interplay between the two statutes is
pervasive, though the admissibility statute is thematically broader in its
coverage. That statute, for example includes more categories than does the
deportability statute and omits exceptions to various criminal grounds present in
the deportability statute. Compare § 1182(a)(2) with § 1227(a)(2). Moreover,
some criminal grounds of inadmissibility do not require an actual conviction,
whereas all criminal deportability grounds do. Compare § 1182(a)(2)(C) – (I),
with § 1227(a)(2)(A) – (H).
84

8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). Although nonimmigrants are subject to
admissibility standards each time they enter the United States, LPRs generally
need only satisfy those requirements at their first entry. Id. § 1101(a)(13)(C).
86

Id. § 1227(a) (providing the standards governing deportation).
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Id. § 1227(a)(2) (listing, for example, qualifying crimes involving
moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, and controlled substance violations).
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admission become “undocumented” and are likewise subject to
deportation.88 Of course, because aliens not legally admitted to the
country have not properly entered the country and are by definition
“undoctumented,” they remain continuously subject to
inadmissibility standards.89 In sum, documented aliens and
undocumented aliens previously admitted are subject to removal if
they fall under any categories listed in the deportation statute;
undocumented aliens not previously admitted are subject to
removal if they fall under a category listed by the inadmissibility
statute.
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To briefly illustrate how these statutes work in practice, assume a
hypothetical alien is suspected of being either inadmissible or
deportable (and therefore removable). When our hypothetically
removable alien comes to the attention of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”),90 ICE will issue to the alien a
Notice to Appear in Immigration Court. The Notice lists factual
allegations related to entry and activity in the United States, as well
as any corresponding charges of removability.91 The alien
thereafter enters civil removal proceedings within the jurisdiction
of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, a civil court
system within the Department of Justice.92
Once in the
88

Id. § 1227(a)(1).

89

One of the grounds of inadmissibility is presence without admission,
making all unlawful entry aliens subject to removal.
8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
90

ICE is one of three components of the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”), created through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, § 446
Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2195 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
All components of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service were
transferred to DHS and divided into ICE, Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”), and Citizenship and Immigration Services (“CIS”). 6 U.S.C. § 291; 8
U.S.C. § 1551 note (Abolition of Immigration and Naturalization Service and
Transfer of Functions). A reorganization plan pursuant to the Homeland
Security Act changed the Bureau of Border Security to ICE and the Customs
Service to the CBP. 6 U.S.C. § 542 note (2002) (Reorganization Plan) (citing
H.R. Doc. 108-32 (2003). These three agencies perform specific duties related
to immigration. 8 U.S.C. § 1551 note (Abolition of Immigration and
Naturalization Service and Transfer of Functions). CBP is responsible for the
admission of aliens and border initiatives. 6 U.S.C. § 2152. CIS is responsible
for applications for immigration status. 6 U.S.C. § 271. ICE is responsible for
apprehending and removing aliens within the United States. 6 U.S.C. §§ 251,
255.
91
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Although immigration law is a subset of administrative law, the
immigration court system is not governed by typical administrative law court
rules. See Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication
Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 598, 611-27 (2009) (describing the more

17

Formatted: Font: 10 pt,
Small caps

Immigration Court, an Immigration Judge, Assistant Chief
Counsel, and the alien—referred to as the respondent—participate
in a bench trial to determine if the alien is inadmissible or
deportable.93 If the judge determines, or the alien admits,
removability, the proceeding moves to evaluating whether the alien
is eligible for relief from removability.94 Should the alien not be
entitled to relief, the judge enters an order of removal directing the
alien to return to her home country.95 If she is eligible for a form
of relief, the result is often a grant of lawful permanent residence.96
Should our hypothetical alien be ineligible for relief, she may
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals and thereafter, if
necessary, to the appropriate United States Circuit Court.97
B.
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What Is Illegal about Being an Illegal?

What could officers on roving patrol near the border be hunting
for? Stated more pointedly, what makes an illegal, illegal? The
question is an important one given that the Immigration Code
distinguishes criminal from civil violations.98 The criminal
limited judicial review in immigration adjudication as compared to
administrative adjudication).
Notably, however, scholars are currently
advocating for reform to the system. See generally, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky,
Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1636 (2010);
Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of Immigration
Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1553-60 (2010) (analyzing possible judicial
specialization in immigration adjudication); Michelel Benedetto, Crisis On The
Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspective, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 467, 485-88
(2008) (advocating judicial ethics reform for immigration adjudication).
93
The alien is entitled to an attorney, but not at the government’s
expense. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(E). In cases charging inadmissibility, the
burden is on the alien to prove that they are admissible. Id. § 1229a(c)(2). For
cases alleging deportability, the government must prove that the alien has lost
her status. Id. § 1229a(c)(3). The Assistant Chief Counsel, from the ICE
Litigation Unit, represents the government at the hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2
(2010).
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As with immigration “status,” there are multiple forms of relief from
removal. Cancellation of removal and asylum are just two examples of relief.
For a better understanding of the types of relief and the requirements for it, see
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE FACT
SHEET, FORMS OF RELIEF FROM REMOVAL (Aug. 3, 2004),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/04/ReliefFromRemoval.pdf.
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8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A).

96

See id. § 1229b.

97

8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.15, 1252(b)(2).

98

Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (describing both civil and criminal
penalties for document fraud), with id. § 1324d (providing civil penalties for
failure to depart pursuant to a final order of removal).
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violations range from misdemeanors to felonies, whereas the civil
violations are punished through fines and the prospect of removal
proceedings in Immigration Court.99 Multiple sections address
more serious immigration-related criminal activity, such as aiding
the unlawful entry of a felon or trafficking for “immoral
purposes.”100 More relevant to this Article, however, are two
criminal provisions that may apply to undocumented aliens with no
other criminal or immigration related past—§§ 1302 and 1325.101

Deleted: sections

The first of these two criminal provisions penalizes an unlawful
entry into the United States as a misdemeanor punishable by up to
six months imprisonment and/or a fine.102 Accordingly, any alien
who enters at an undesignated time or place, by eluding inspection,
or through fraudulent means, may be criminally punished.103 By
way of limitation, however, the criminal penalties associated with
unlawful entry apply only to undocumented aliens who enter the
country without permission (but not to those undocumented aliens
who overstay a visa).104
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Undocumented aliens might also violate registration requirements
by failing to register upon entering the United States.105 Indeed,
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For example, the Code punishes, as a first offense, eluding inspection
at a port of entry with a fine and/or up to six months in prison. Id. § 1325(a)(2).
For the second offense of eluding inspection, an alien will be subject to a fine
and up to two years imprisonment. Id. The Code also provides for civil
penalties for eluding: $50-250 for the first offense and $100-500 for the second
offense. Id. § 1325(b). Commission of eluding triggers removal proceedings.
Id. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
100

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1323, 1324, 1326, 1327, 1328. An immoral
purpose is generally defined as importation of individuals for prostitution.
United States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94, 103 (1st Cir. 1991).
101

8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1305.

102

8 U.S.C. § 1325.

103
Id. The Supreme Court has specifically declined to determine
whether unlawful entry in violation of § 1302(a) proscribes a continuing offense,
reasoning even a single violation suffices as a basis for removal regardless of
whether it is continuing in nature. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1047
n.3 (1984).
104

8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (criminally punishing only entering or
attempting to enter).
105

Id. § 1302. Requiring an alien who has not registered pursuant to a
visa application but has been present in the United States for longer than thirty
days to apply for registration would seem simple enough. Yet the Department
of Justice does not clarify how an undocumented alien can comply with the
requirement, despite clear Code language requiring the Attorney General to
create registration forms and procedures. 8 U.S.C. § 1304. The absence of an
established procedure for compliance suggests that it is, in fact, impossible for
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the Code requires any alien present in the United States for longer
than thirty days to apply for registration and be fingerprinted.106
Following registration, aliens must notify the Attorney General of
an address change within ten days of such change.107 Importantly,
an alien’s willful failure to register is punishable as a
misdemeanor, and a willful failure to provide notification of an
address change is punishable as a misdemeanor and the initiation
of removal proceedings.108
At this point, it is worth recalling that there exists more than one
type of “undocumented alien” in the United States—those who
enter the country unlawfully, and those who overstay their visas.109
Aliens who have overstayed their visas initially registered to obtain
the visa and are therefore exempt from the registration
requirements governing those who enter the country unlawfully.110
That same exemption extends to any undocumented alien who
previously applied for any immigration benefit, like temporary
protected status, or asylum.111 Accordingly, this particular
registration requirement applies only to those undocumented aliens
who have never before applied for an immigration benefit.112
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As noted, there are two separate consequences to being
an alien to actually register properly (though it may also suggest that it would
likewise be impossible for an alien to willfully fail to register).
106

Id. § 1302(a) (requiring aliens who are fourteen or older to register);
see id. § 1302(b) (requiring the parents or legal guardians of aliens under the age
of fourteen to register them and transfer the duty to register and be fingerprinted
to the alien upon attaining fourteen years of age).
107

Id. § 1305(a).

108

Id. § 1306.
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Statistics compiled and provided by the government fail to clarify
what percentage of the current undocumented population falls under either of
these categories. Although the percentage of undocumented aliens who overstay
their legal entry—as opposed to those who entered unlawfully—is difficult to
discern, some estimates suggest that 25% to 40% of the population are visa
overstays. Fact Sheet, Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant
Population, PEW HISPANIC CTR., MODES OF ENTRY FOR THE UNAUTHORIZED
MIGRANT
POPULATION
2-3
(May
22,
2006),
http://pewhispanic.org/factsheets/factsheet.php?FactsheetID=19.
110

8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(b), 1301, 1302.

111

Id.
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Cf. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1047 n.3 (noting that the failure to
properly register as an alien upon entering the United States is a crime).
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undocumented: civil penalties in the form of removal from the
country if they are removable, and criminal penalties if the alien
has violated certain sections of the Code. But, who is charged with
identifying which immigrants are subject to these penalties?
Customs and Border Protection agents apprehend by far the
highest numbers of undocumented aliens at or near the border.113
Yet, ICE also has a significant apprehension role by using internal
initiatives to apprehend aliens within the United States, like
workplace raids.114 More relevant to this Article, however, is the
relationship ICE has with local law enforcement, which
relationship enables local authorities to help enforce both the civil
and criminal aspects of immigration law.115
Although federal law permits federal and state collaboration on
immigration law enforcement,116 local and state policy or
legislation ultimately determines the actual involvement of local
law enforcement. Some local policies may, for example, require
local authorities to work directly with ICE.117 Yet, alternatively,
other local policies could create a so-called “sanctuary city” by
prohibiting local contact with federal agencies about immigration
enforcement.118 When analyzing the propriety of a state policy, 18
113

Securing America’s Borders: CBP Fiscal Year 2009 in Review Fact
Sheet, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, (Nov. 24, 2009),
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/2009_news_rele
ases/nov_09/11242009_5.xml. Aliens apprehended at the border generally go
through an expedited removal process in lieu of the removal process described
above. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
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In 2008, ICE removed over 350,000 “illegal” aliens from the United
States. ICE Annual Report Fiscal Year 2008: Executive Summary, U.S. IMMIGR.
AND
CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT
(2008),
http://www.ice.gov/pi/reports/annual_report/2008/ar_2008_page3.htm. Perhaps
one of the most infamous recent raids took place in Postville, Iowa, in May
2008, during which 389 immigrants were arrested at a meat-processing plant—
the largest employer in northeast Iowa. Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Raid Jars a
Small Town, WASH. POST, May 18, 2008 at A1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/05/17/AR2008051
702474.html.
115

Lisa M. Seghetti et al., Enforcing Immigration Law: The Role of
State and Local Law Enforcement, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., (March 11, 2009),
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32270.pdf (reviewing the recent
trends in relationships between local law enforcement and federal agencies).
116
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Although a more in-depth discussion follows, the main tool for
involving local law enforcement is Section 287(g) programs. These programs
create an explicit connection between local law enforcement and DHS through a
Memorandum of Agreement. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
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U.S.C. § 1373(a) unavoidably takes center-stage because it
prevents local and state authorities from prohibiting or restricting
communication with ICE about the immigration status of any
individual.119
Although the statute does not require
communication between localities and ICE, it no doubt influences
how local governments set policy.120
118
Traditionally, sanctuary cities essentially adopt “don’t ask, don’t
tell” policies. Alex Koppelman, Congress to New York (and Chicago and L.A.):
Drop
Dead,
SALON,
Oct.
4,
2007,
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/10/04/sanctuary/index.html. Although
the 1980’s saw a large influx of such cities, the rising concerns with aliens
committing serious criminal offenses and infiltrating certain areas have left few
true sanctuary cities remaining. See Seghetti, supra note 115 at 18-19 (noting the
increasingly “contentious” nature of sanctuary cities and the contrasting
jurisdictional actions regarding sanctuary policies); Laura Sullivan, Note,
Enforcing Nonenforcement: Countering the Threat Posed to Sanctuary Laws by
the Inclusion of Immigration Records in the National Crime Information Center
Database, 97 CAL. L. REV. 567, 573-78 (2009) (discussing the increasing
popularity of sanctuary cities, but noting the federal and state laws designed to
curtail their effectiveness); Jennifer M. Hansen, Comment, Sanctuary’s Demise:
The Unintended Effects of State and Local Law Enforcement, 10 SCHOLAR 289,
306-08 (2008) (same).

The city of San Francisco nicely illustrates this evolution. Once a
“don’t ask, don’t tell” city, highly publicized violent offenses by undocumented
youth caused San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom to require local authorities to
begin reporting youths arrested on suspicion of felonies to ICE. Jessie
McKinley, San Francisco at Crossroads Over Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 2009, at A12. The Board of Supervisors later amended the Mayor’s order to
require reporting only those actually convicted of felonies. Rachel Gordon,
Standoff Over Sanctuary Law, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., March 4, 2010,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/cityinsider/detail?entry_id=58481.
The
city is currently divided over whether to follow California’s agreement with the
federal Secure Communities program, which would require the city’s local law
enforcement to submit the fingerprints of any person booked through their
criminal system. Rachel Gordon, Tug-of-War Over IDing Illegals, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., May 26, 2010, at C1.
119

Title 8 USC §1373(a) provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local
law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official
may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity
or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service information regarding the
citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any
individual.
Id.
120

For example, the Texas Attorney General has opined that local
policies preventing communication with federal agencies are likely a “nullity,”
and that “[t]he Texas Legislature is not prohibited from adopting some form of
legislation designed to compel local governments to comply with any duties
they have under federal immigration laws, so long as such legislation is not
inconsistent with federal law.” Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0699 (2009).
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Of course, § 1373 more than suggests the impropriety of sanctuary
cities. A true sanctuary city is one in which local officials have
determined that no government employee will report
undocumented aliens to federal immigration officials.121 Pursuant
to such a policy, members of law enforcement are not permitted to
ask suspects questions about their immigration status during an
arrest, a conviction, or even during the detention phase following
their conviction.122 Not surprisingly, few true sanctuary cities
remain. More commonly, a range of local policies now exist; on
the one end, a locality might employ a “don’t ask, don’t tell”
program, whereas on the other, a locality might fully disclose all
collected immigration information to DHS. Most cities exist
between these two extremes, creating policies to address both the
level of participation with ICE,123 as well as the stage during which
individuals are reported to ICE.124

Several communities in Texas have since joined the Secure Communities federal
program that, in short, allows for communication about detained individuals to
DHS. Julian Aguilar, More Detainers Placed on Immigrants, TEXAS TRIBUNE,
June
21,
2010,
http://www.texastribune.org/immigration-intexas/immigration/more-detainers-placed-on-immigrants/.
Even
Dallas,
historically a sanctuary city, now participates in the Secure Communities
program. Dianne Solis, Dallas County is Part of Secure Communities Program
that Raises Immigrant Profiling Concerns, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July
31,
2010,
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/city/dallas/stories/072510d
nmetsecure.38cbe0d.html.
121

See Seghetti, supra note 115, at 26.

122

For example, Haines Borough, Alaska, prohibits the Borough, its
officers, employees and agents from enforcing immigration matters. Haines
Borough, Alaska, Resolution 5-12-078 (Dec. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.hainesborough.us/Resolutions/R511278.pdf. To see a list of all
“sanctuary cities” in the country along with a comprehensive list of the types of
laws in place, visit the National Immigration center website at Laws, Resolutions
and Policies Instituted Across the U.S. Limiting Enforcement of Immigration
Laws by State and Local Authorities, NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., 1 (Dec. 2008),
http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/locallaw-limiting-tbl-2008-1203.pdf.
123

For instance, some cities contact ICE only when a felony is
involved, but do not check the immigration status of misdemeanants. CICERO,
ILL., POLICE DEPARTMENT GENERAL ORDER 61-01-02 (1998), available at
http://www.democracyinaction.org/dia/organizationsORG/NILC/images/Cicero
PoliceDept.pdf; NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., supra note 122, at 6.
124

In promulgating a local policy to govern relations with the federal
government, various cities make decisions on whether to cooperate based on
when cooperation would be required; i.e., at the arrest stage, the charging stage,
and the conviction stage. See supra notes 115, 118 and accompanying text.
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To be considered alongside local policies are certain federal
programs that exist to promote joint state and federal cooperation.
In 2007, for example, ICE created the Criminal Alien Program,
now active in all 114 federal and state prisons, and over 300 local
jails, which is designed to help identify removable aliens by
allowing federal access to local databases of incarcerated
individuals.125 Consider also the “Secure Communities” program,
which began in 2008 after a congressional appropriation to ICE.126
The program, in brief, allows local law enforcement to transmit
data to ICE about individuals it determines are foreign nationals.127
Although the nominal purpose of the program is to focus on
serious criminal offenders, the program’s scope includes a range of
criminal offenses and delegates to local ICE offices the discretion
to set enforcement priorities.128
More informally, localities might also simply contact federal
authorities following the arrest and booking of an individual in a
local jail. If, for instance, a member of local law enforcement
alerts federal authorities after stopping an undocumented alien who
is suspected of a criminal offense, like unlawful entry or failure to
depart after an order of removal, that alien can be placed in federal
criminal proceedings.129 Importantly, civil proceedings may
immediately also commence, wholly apart from any criminal
consequences, if federal authorities suspect the alien should be
removed.130
Deleted:

125

Fact Sheet: Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT,
1
(Nov.
19,
2008),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/factsheets/criminal_alien_program.pdf.;
Andrea Guttin, Special Report, The Criminal Alien Program: Immigration
Enforcement in Travis County, Texas, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR., 6 (2010),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Criminal_Alien_Progr
am_021710.pdf.
126

IMMIGR’N AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY FACT SHEET,
SECURE COMMUNITIES 1 (Sept. 1,
2009),http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/factsheets/secure_communities.pdf.
127

Id.

128

Id. Over 550 local jurisdictions in twenty-seven states cities have
already signed up for the Secure Communities program. Activated Jurisdictions,
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, (Aug. 17, 2010),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure_communities/pdf/sc_activated.pdf.
Nationwide access to the program will be available by 2013. Id.
129

See supra note 99 and accompanying text.

130
8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Such a consequence is permissible given that
federal courts have uniformly held that many of the constitutional protections
afforded to those in criminal proceedings are not required in civil immigration
proceedings. See, e.g., Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050 (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceedings); Galvan v. Press,
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Yet, most relevant to this Article is the extensive partnership
between federal and local/state law enforcement, known
colloquially as “287(g) programs.”131 In short, 287(g) programs
allow for the federal deputization of local law enforcement.132 The
program permits local officers—pursuant to a written agreement
with DHS—to carry out federal immigration functions like
investigation, apprehension and/or detention.133 Although the
deputized officers remain employed by the locality,134 they operate
under “the direction and supervision of the Attorney General.”135
As such, they are considered federal employees for purposes of
determining individual or governmental liability, and for
determining their compensation following a work-related injury.136
The programs also allow for unfettered federal access to local
information; indeed, there is no requirement that an alien be in a
specific stage of criminal proceeding (arrest, charge, conviction,
etc.) before the individual’s information is available to federal
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347 U.S. 522, 529-31 (1954) (finding the ex post facto Clause does not apply in
deportation proceedings); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 808 (1st Cir.
1977) (finding that Miranda rights are not applicable in deportation
proceedings); but see Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 493 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that an egregious violation of Fourth Amendment rights can result in
the exclusion of evidence).
131

Section 287(g) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

[The Attorney General may] enter into a written agreement
with a State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to
which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who
is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to
perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the
investigation, apprehension or detention of aliens in the United
States (including the transportation of such aliens across State
line s to detention centers), may carry out such function at the
expense of the State or political subdivision and to extent
consistent with State and local law.
8 U.S.C. § 1357. For a link to each Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
between ICE and a locality, For a link to each Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) between ICE and a locality, see Delegation of Immigration Authority
Section 287(g), U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/section287_g.htm#signed-moa.
132

Id.

133

8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1).

134

Id. § 1357(g)(7).

135

Id. § 1357(g)(3).

136

Id. § 1357(g)(8), (g)(7).
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authorities.137 Thus, although there are multiple ways in which
local law enforcement agencies are connected to federal officials at
ICE, the most extensive relationship exists through 287(g)
programs.
III.
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Synthesizing just a few of the Supreme Court’s decisions in the
context of that brief immigration discussion demonstrates how
much discretion even local officers possess in ordinary street and
car stop encounters. As one of our former Criminal Procedure
professors was fond of saying, “in no other job does discretion
increase the lower down on the hierarchical chain you go.”
Perhaps stated mathematically, Terry + White + Whren = nearly
unfettered officer discretion. That quote and mathematical
expression tell only part of the story. When Brigoni-Ponce,
Arvizu, and 287(g) programs are added to the proverbial discretion
equation, it becomes clear that no meaningful checks exist on the
authority of deputized law enforcement at the border or its
functional equivalent.138 Profiling, ethnic targeting, and outright
racism supported (masked?) by “reasonable suspicion” all seem
constitutionally permissible at or near the border.139 And,
137
See generally id. § 1357(g)(2) (providing for federal access to local
information without requiring an alien to be in a particular stage of a criminal
case).
138

To be clear, border patrol agents have no authority to stop a car on
the basis of a suspected traffic violation. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1357
(empowering immigration officers to interrogate aliens or suspected aliens as to
his right to be in the U.S.; to make certain arrests of aliens violating immigration
laws, usually in the officer’s presence or view; to board vessels in territorial
water; conduct warrantless searches of persons seeking admission when
reasonable cause exists to suspect the person is not admissible; and to take
custody of aliens arrested for violation of drug laws). White and Whren are
nonetheless applicable because, as noted, the creation of 287(g) programs allow
for federal deputization of local law enforcement.
139

That same reasonable suspicion may of course extend even to traffic
offenses. See supra note 57 and accompanying citations. Despite the stated
objective of 287(g) to target violent or serious criminals, many jurisdictions
have seen a rise in traffic violations and subsequent removal proceedings. See
Sarah Ovaska, Data: Most Deportees Are Minor Offenders, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER,
Mar.
25,
2010,
available
at
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2010/03/25/1335099/data-most-deporteesare-minor.html. Some therefore claim that 287(g) programs impose too much of
a burden on local police and shift their focus from localized law enforcement to
federal immigration enforcement. See Hannah Gladstein et al., Blurring the
Lines: A Profile of State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Law
Using the National Crime Information Center Database, 2002-2004,
MIGRATION
POL’Y
INST.,
at
7
(Dec.
2005),
http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI_report_Blurring_the_Lines_120805.pdf.
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remember, there are no constitutional protections awaiting the
alien in immigration proceedings.140
From the standpoint of the Fourth Amendment, it also seems
reasonably clear at this point that the Arizona Act is
constitutional.141 After all, Arizona simply codified what the
Supreme Court’s holdings permit. Indeed, the Arizona Act is the
product of its surrounding jurisprudential environment; an
environment that over time has come to implicitly condone law
enforcement conduct that, according to recent press, has finally
crossed the threshold into conduct society is not prepared to accept
as reasonable.
Apart from the public outcry surrounding the Arizona Act,
applying the reasonable suspicion standard to assessing a citizen’s
immigration status seems to further eviscerate the Court’s core
holding in Terry. Given that the reasonable suspicion standard
now applies to other non-criminal conduct, like traffic offenses,142
140

Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038 (“Consistent with the civil nature
of the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context do not apply in a
deportation hearing.”). Addressing the inapplicability of, for example, the
exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings, the Supreme Court has relied
heavily on to the specific training and specialization of immigration officers. Id.
at 1044-46. Yet, as the lines between criminal enforcement and immigration
enforcement at the local level are blurred, “[n]onfederal actors who are using
immigration enforcement powers to achieve their criminal law objectives are
able to circumvent some of the constitutional baselines that apply to criminal
policing without confronting the sanctions that would be available in the
criminal system.” Jennifer M. Chácon, A Diversion of Attention: Immigration
Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE
L.J. 1563, 1570 (2010).
141
As foretold by Judge Bolton’s recent opinion, the Arizona law may
unconstitutionally violate the Supremacy Clause. See supra note 20 and
accompanying text. At present, there is a split among federal circuit courts as to
whether the federal Immigration Reform and Act preempts all state and local
regulation of immigration. Compare Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano,
544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that Arizona’s “Legal Arizona
Workers Act” is facially constitutional), opinion amended and superseded on
denial of reh’g, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed sub nom.,
Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 78 U.S.L.W. 3065 (U.S. Jul. 24, 2009)
(No. 09-115), with Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517-29
(M.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that state-based immigration ordinances are expressly
and impliedly preempted).
142

See, e.g., supra note 57 and accompanying citations; United States
v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Our sole inquiry is
whether this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this particular
motorist violated any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment
regulations of the jurisdiction. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted));
Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189-90 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“The
Fourth Amendment requires that an officer making [a temporary detention
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it is easy to forget that Terry limited its reasonable suspicion
standard to an officer’s belief that “criminal activity may be afoot
and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous.”143 Yet, there is nothing necessarily criminal
about an individual’s status as “undocumented.”144 And, unlike an
officer’s belief that a person committed a traffic offense, there’s
something far more normatively uncomfortable about allowing
officers to generate the requisite reasonable suspicion to believe an
individual is undocumented by relying in whole or in part on that
individual’s Mexican ethnicity. That same discomfort, albeit in the
context of race, generated an overflow of scholarship skewering
the Court for its decision in Whren.145
Moreover, even if the holding in Whren in particular is somehow
faithful to Terry’s requirement that officers believe criminal
activity is afoot, lower court decisions interpreting the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence suggest that the pendulum favoring police
discretion has swung too far in the border context. Should, for
example, border patrol agents stop a blue van traveling at 9:30 pm
at a normal rate of speed about fifteen miles from the Del Rio
border area on a road that lacks a checkpoint? Yes, says the Fifth
Circuit.146 In United States v. Zapata-Ibarra,147 a veteran border
during a traffic stop] have probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the person
stopped has committed a traffic violation or is otherwise engaged in or about to
be engaged in criminal activity.” (internal citations omitted)); United States v.
Mariscal, 285 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment
requires only reasonable suspicion in the context of investigative traffic stops.”
(internal citations and quotations omitted)).
143

Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added).

144

See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.

145

See, e.g., Hon. Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A. Daly, State
Constitutional Analysis of Pretext Stops: Racial Profiling and Public Policy
Concerns, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 597 (1999); Mark M. Dobson, The Police,
Pretextual Investigatory Activity, and the Fourth Amendment: What Hath Whren
Wrought?, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 707, 763 (1997); Diana Roberto Donahoe,
“Could Have,” “Would Have:” What the Supreme Court Should Have Decided
in Whren v. United States, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1193, 1194 (1997); David A.
Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the Highway, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 556, 585 (1998); Illya Lichtenberg, Police Discretion and Traffic
Enforcement: A Government of Men?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 425, 451 (20022003).
146

In truth, the driver’s proximity to the border in this hypothetical
likely ends the inquiry. Border patrol agents may stop and interrogate “any alien
or person believed to be an alien” who is “within a reasonable distance from any
external boundary of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(1), (3). Federal
regulations interpret the term “reasonable distance” to mean a distance “within
100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States[.]” As on district
court noted, “Title 8 U.S.C. § 1357 seems to give officers of the INS, including
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patrol agent of ten years—armed with only the preceding facts—
made a U-turn after passing the blue van and ultimately elected to
stop the van after (1) it slowed down, (2) the officer saw several
passengers, (3) the passengers appeared to slouch down, and (4)
the van was driving on an indirect route based on its place of
registration.148 Relying on the Brigoni-Ponce factors, the court
upheld the stop as constitutional by reasoning that the van was
close to the Mexican border, the road was a known smuggling
route, the agent was experienced, the van slowed down after
witnessing the agent make a U-turn, and the van had several
passengers.149
The court’s holding in Zapata-Ibarra is neither unique nor
surprising.150 As detailed above, the Supreme Court has showered
border agents with discretionary power and it should therefore
surprise no one that wholly innocent behavior may provide agents
with “reasonable suspicion.”
Another noteworthy but perhaps equally unsurprising result is the
cost exacted from society by arming border patrol agents with
inordinate discretion. In July of 2008, five individuals and Somos
America, a Latino community-based coalition, sued Maricopa
County, Arizona, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, the Maricopa County
Sheriff’s Office and Maricopa County, charging that they or their
members were unlawfully stopped and mistreated by law
enforcement because they are Latino.151 The class-action suit
Border Patrol agents, complete discretion to stop vehicles without a warrant or
probable cause within a reasonable distance of the border.” United States v.
Rubio-Hernandez, 39 F. Supp. 808, 831 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
147

212 F.3d 877 (5th Cir. 2000).

148

Id. at 879-80.

149

Id. at 881-84.

150
See, e.g., United State v. Magana, 797 F.2d 777, 781-82 (9th Cir.
1986); United States v. Garcia, 732 F.2d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Gabriel Gonzalez, No. 05-250, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36728, **23-31
(D. P.R. Nov. 1, 2005); but see United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d
1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The likelihood that in an area in which the majority
- or even a substantial part - of the population is Hispanic, any given person of
Hispanic ancestry is in fact an alien, let alone an illegal alien, is not high enough
to make Hispanic appearance a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion
calculus.”); Rubio-Hernandez, 39 F. Supp. at 834-37 (finding no reasonable
suspicion to support a stop despite the facts that the driver was Hispanic, he did
not acknowledge agents as he passed them, swerved and looked into the
rearview mirror nervously, and drove on a common route for smugglers).
151

First Amended Complaint at 2-3, Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 F. Supp.
2d 1025 (D. Ariz. 2008) (No. CV 07-02513-PHX-MHM), 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 111256.

29

alleges, inter alia, that Arpaio and the county (1) engaged in
generalized “crime suppression sweeps” in Latino neighborhoods
of day laborers; (2) made a public statement that physical
appearance alone is sufficient to question an individual about their
immigration status; and (3) volunteers were used to assist in these
crime sweeps who have known animosity towards Hispanics and
immigrants.152
Although defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint, the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona denied the motion via memorandum opinion in February
2009.153 And, although the litigation remains ongoing, it is
perhaps worth noting that defendants were recently sanctioned for
destroying evidence.154
More attenuated consequences of the Supreme Court’s discretiongranting jurisprudence have also surfaced outside Arizona. In New
York, for example, Nassau County enacted what critics have
dubbed the “waving while Latino” law, which ordinance was
enacted to curb soliciting immigrant day laborers.155 And, in
Texas, the Northern District recently struck down legislation
enacted by the City of Farmers Branch, which conditions residence
in rental housing within the City on lawful presence in the United
States.156 Finally, in Pennsylvania, a federal judge in 2007 struck
down an ordinance in Hazelton designed to bar undocumented
immigrants from working or renting homes there.157 Of course,
back in Arizona, challenges to the constitutionality of SB 1070
have already surfaced.158
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The next question is an obvious one—what now? First, consistent
with Terry, roving border patrol stops should be made on the basis
of reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver or the vehicle’s
occupants are engaged in criminal activity. A mere belief or
unparticularized hunch that the driver or her occupants are
undocumented is insufficient.
Second, as part of the reasonable suspicion calculus at the border,
the factors provided by the Court in Brigoni-Ponce require
revision. Can it be, in 2010, that “[t]he likelihood that any given
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make
Mexican appearance a relevant factor” in the reasonable suspicion
calculation?159 True, 86.1% of those apprehended at the border
between 2005-08 for being undocumented in the United States
were Mexican nationals.160 That statistic undoubtedly suggests
that nationality is a significant factor at the border. The
constitutional problem, however, arises away from the border:
although it is a crime to enter the country undocumented,161 it is
not necessarily criminally punishable to otherwise simply be in the
country undocumented.162 Given that Mexicans—and immigrants
generally—are no more prone than any other ethnicity or race to
committing crimes,163 the color of one’s skin can play no role in
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assessing whether a crime has taken place or is ongoing.
Accordingly, at least for agents seeking to establish reasonable
suspicion outside the border or its functional equivalent,
nationality should play no role.
Finally, wholly innocent conduct should not be the sole or
exclusive basis upon which to allow border patrol agents to
effectuate a stop. Admittedly, “[l]aw enforcement officers may
perceive meaning in actions that appear innocuous to the untrained
observer.”164 But, when so many of the lawful factors that
comprise the reasonable suspicion calculus at the border—vehicle
type, looking nervous, failing to acknowledge law enforcement,
nationality, number of passengers—are common to so many
people, courts should require agents to articulate some basis to
believe criminal activity is intertwined with this otherwise lawful
conduct. As the Eighth Circuit has noted, “[g]eneral profiles that
fit large numbers of innocent people do not establish reasonable
suspicion.”165 If the Supreme Court—or even a modest handful of
other circuits—felt similarly, perhaps states like Arizona would
think twice before enacting legislation like SB 1070. As it stands
now, however, that law does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
According to President Obama, the Arizona Act is
“irresponsib[le]” and threatens “to undermine basic notions of
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/05/02/20100502arizona-borderviolence-mexico.html#ixzz0nusJD9IB.
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years.”).
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fairness that we cherish as Americans, as well as the trust between
police and our communities that is so crucial to keeping us
safe.”166 Maybe, but blame does not reside exclusively with the
Arizona legislature. The Arizona Act is merely the foreseeable
consequences of nearly three decades worth of Supreme Court
decisions that have gradually increased the discretionary
capabilities of law enforcement. And nowhere is that discretion
higher than at the border.
The true fix is not at the legislative level. Sure, federal
immigration reform may prove helpful.
Yet, to avoid
“irresponsible” legislation, the Supreme Court must rearticulate the
reasonable suspicion standard to, consistent with Terry, make clear
that officers must believe that the suspect is engaged in criminal
activity. And, as part of the reasonable suspicion calculus, border
patrol agents must not be allowed to take the color of a suspect’s
skin into account. Finally, circuit and district courts should no
longer permit wholly innocent conduct to constitute the sole or
exclusive basis upon which to allow border patrol agents to
effectuate a stop.
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